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Economic research has produced conflicting findings on the distributional impacts of 
migrant remittances, and there has been little research on the effects of changes in 
remittances on poverty.  This paper utilizes new data from the Mexico National Rural 
Household Survey, together with inequality and poverty decomposition techniques, to 
explore the impacts of remittances on rural inequality and poverty.  Our findings suggest 
that remittances from international migrants become more equalizing (or less 
unequalizing), as well as more effective at reducing poverty, as the prevalence of 
migration increases.    
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Impacts of migrant remittances on income inequality have been a focus of 
considerable economic research.  However, findings often have been contradictory, and a 
unifying theory of remittances and inequality has been elusive.  The influence of 
remittances on poverty largely has been ignored in the development economics literature.  
There has been no effort, to our knowledge, to estimate the effect of remittances on rural 
poverty in Mexico using household data. 
 
This paper explores the impact of migration and remittances on the distribution of 
rural income and on rural poverty, using Gini and poverty decomposition techniques and 
data from the 2003 Mexico National Rural Household Survey.  The goal of this research 
is to analyze both distributional and poverty effects of migrant remittances in regions 
with differing levels of migration prevalence.  Our underlying thesis is that, in the case of 
international migration, which entails significant costs and risks, the impacts of 
remittances are more equalizing and have a larger effect on alleviating poverty as the 
share of households with access to remittances increases.  
 
I 
Research on Remittances, Inequality and Poverty 
 
A number of researchers have examined the distributional effects of migrant 
remittances by comparing income distributions with and without remittances (Barham 
  1and Boucher, 1998; Oberai and Singh, 1980; Knowles and Anker, 1981) or by using 
income-source decompositions of inequality measures (Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki, 1986, 
1988;  Adams, 1989, 1991;  Adams and Alderman, 1992).  These studies offer conflicting 
findings about the impact of remittances on inequality.  Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) 
provide a theoretical explanation for these conflicting findings.  They argue that rural out-
migration, like the adoption of a new production technology, entails costs and risks.  The 
costs and risks are likely to be especially high in the case of international migration.  
Given this fact, pioneer migrants tend to come from households at the upper-middle or 
top of the sending-area's income distribution (e.g., Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Lipton, 
1980), and the income they send home in the form of remittances is therefore likely to 
widen income inequalities in migrant-source areas.   
  
Over time, access to migrant labor markets becomes diffused across sending-area 
households through the growth and elaboration of migrant networks (see Massey, 
Goldring, and Durand, 1994), much as new agricultural technologies become diffused 
across farms.  If households at the middle or bottom of the income distribution gain 
access to migrant labor markets, an initially unequalizing effect of remittances may be 
dampened or reversed.  Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) found that remittances from 
international migrants had an unequalizing effect on the income distribution in a Mexican 
village that recently had begun to send migrants abroad, but an equalizing effect on 
another village that had a long history of participating in international migration.  The 
present research extends Stark, et al.  It uses nationally representative data from rural 
Mexico to estimate the marginal effects of both international and internal migrant 
  2remittances on inequality in regions with different levels of migration prevalence.  If the 
migration diffusion hypothesis is correct, one would expect to find a negative correlation 
between the prevalence of international migration (i.e., the share of households with 
migrants abroad) and the marginal impact of international-migrant remittances on 
inequality.  For internal migration, which usually entails lower costs and risks, one would 
expect this correlation to be weaker. 
 
Remittances and Poverty 
 
Interactions between migration and poverty—both at migrant origins and 
destinations—are among the least researched and understood topics in economics.  This 
is surprising, because the majority of the world’s migration originates in rural areas, 
where most of the world’s poverty is also concentrated.   
 
The possible impacts of migration on poverty are bracketed by two extremes, 
which we might call the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” scenarios.   
 
The optimistic scenario is that migration reduces poverty in source areas by 
shifting population from the low-income rural sector to the relatively high-income urban 
(or foreign) economy. Income remittances by migrants contribute to incomes of 
households in migrant-source areas.  If remittances are significant and if some migrants 
originate from poor households, remittances may reduce rural poverty.  
 
  3The pessimistic view is that poor households face liquidity, risk, and perhaps 
other constraints that limit their access to migrant labor markets.  This is particularly 
likely to be the case for international migration, which usually entails high transportation 
and entry costs (e.g., smugglers’ or recruiters’ fees).  Households and individuals 
participating in migration benefit (otherwise, it is not clear why they would participate).  
However, these beneficiaries of migration may not include the rural poor.  If migration is 
costly and risky, at least initially migrants may come from the middle or upper segments 
of the source-areas income distribution, not from the poorest households.  The poor will 
not benefit unless obstacles to their participation in migration weaken over time. 
 
The true impacts of migration on poverty are likely to be found not at one extreme 
or another, but somewhere in between and varying over time.  The diffusion hypothesis 
presented above for inequality may also apply to poverty.  Initially, when few households 
have access to migrant labor markets abroad, international-migrant remittances are likely 
to flow primarily to middle and upper-income families.  If this is the case, then changes 
in remittances will have little effect on poverty.  However, if access to international 
migration eventually becomes diffused downward through the income distribution, 
poverty may become increasingly sensitive to changes in remittances.  That is, there may 
be a negative relationship between the prevalence of international migration and the 
marginal effect of international-migrant remittances on poverty.  A given percentage 
increase in remittances would reduce poverty by a greater amount in a region where a 
large share of households have migrants abroad than in a region in which households 
with international migrants are rare.  If internal migration is low cost and entails little 
  4risk, even the “pioneer” internal migrants may originate from poor households, and so the 
relationship between internal migration prevalence and poverty impacts of remittances is 
likely to be weaker.  If remittances from internal migrants are lower than remittances 
from international migrations, this would further attenuate the impact of a given 
percentage change in internal remittances on poverty, even if many internal migrants 
come from poor rural households.  
 
Some insights into migration-poverty interactions may be gleaned, mostly 
indirectly, from the existing literature.  Adams (2004) compared the poverty headcount, 
poverty gap, and squared poverty gap of Guatemalan households that received 
remittances from international and/or internal migrants, with those of households that did 
not receive remittance income.  He found that both internal and international remittances 
reduced poverty.  Remittances had a quantitatively larger effect on the severity of poverty 
(the “poverty gap”) than on the poverty rate (headcount).  This study highlights the 
importance of taking into account both the incidence and severity of poverty when 
measuring remittance impacts.  Adams (1986) found that international remittances had a 
small but favorable effect on poverty in a sample of households in rural Egypt.  The 
number of households in poverty declines by 9.8 percent, and the Sen poverty index falls 
by 12 percent, when per-capita incomes are calculated without including remittances.  
Adams and Page (2003) performed a cross-country analysis of international migration 
and poverty.  They found that a 10-percent increase in international migration (the share 
of a country’s population living abroad) was associated with a 1.9-percent decrease in the 
share of people living in poverty.  In a study of 2400 municipalities, Lopez Cordova 
  5(2004) found that a higher prevalence of remittances (fraction of households receiving 
remittances) was correlated with lower poverty (using a headcount measure) in 2000.  
 
To our knowledge, no study has estimated the marginal impact of migrant 
remittances on the incidence and severity of poverty in rural Mexico; the differential 
effect of remittances from internal and international migrants; or differences in 
remittance effects on poverty across regions with varying migration histories.  The 
present research takes a step towards filling this lacuna by using rural household survey 
data to estimate the effects of marginal changes in migrant remittances on poverty in rural 
areas with differing levels of migration prevalence.  We do this with three variants of the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty index. 
 
II 
Migration, Remittances, Inequality and Poverty in Rural Mexico 
 
In the past decade rural Mexico has experienced a massive outflow of rural labor 
to Mexican urban centers and to the United States.  Between 1990 and 2002, the share of 
Mexico’s rural population working in the United States rose from 7% to 14%, and the 
share at internal-migrant destinations rose from 11% to 15%; however, the share varies 
widely across regions (Mora and Taylor, 2004).  This makes Mexico an ideal laboratory 
in which to examine impacts of migration and remittances in rural areas with different 
levels of integration with migrant labor markets.   
 
  6To date, empirical research on economic impacts of migration in rural Mexico has 
been based on detailed surveys of small numbers of communities, at best.  This, together 
with the tremendous heterogeneity that characterizes rural Mexico, has limited the extent 
to which findings from these studies can be generalized to the rural economy as a whole.   
 
The present research uses new data from the Mexico National Rural Household 
Survey (Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico, or ENHRUM).  This survey 
provides detailed data on assets, socio-demographic characteristics, production, income 
sources, and migration from a nationally representative sample of rural households 
surveyed in January and February 2003.  The sample includes 1,782 households in 14 
states.  INEGI, Mexico’s national information and census office, designed the sampling 
frame to provide a statistically reliable characterization of Mexico’s population living in 
rural areas, or communities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.  For reasons of cost and 
tractability, individuals in hamlets or disperse populations with fewer than 500 
inhabitants were not included in the survey.
1  The result is a sample that is representative 
of more than 80 percent of the population that the Mexican census office considers to be 
rural.   
 
To implement the survey, Mexico was divided into five regions, reflecting 
INEGI’s standard regionalization of the country:  Center, South-Southeast, West-Center, 
Northwest, and Northeast.  The survey was designed to be representative both nationally 
and regionally.  Data from this survey make it possible to quantify migration and 
                                                 
1 The percentage of the population of Mexico that lives in hamlets of less than 500 people 
is no more than 20% in 2000, INEGI, Population Census 2000. 
  7remittances at the household level, as well as to test for influences of these variables on 
household total income, on income inequality, and on poverty.   
 
Table 1 summarizes migration from households in rural Mexico.  Sixteen percent 
of all households in the sample had a family member living in the United States at the 
start of 2002, the year of the survey, and 26 percent had a family member living in 
another part of Mexico.  Many households had more than one migrant.  The number of 
U.S. migrants per household ranged from 0 to 9, while the number of internal migrants 
ranged from 0 to 10.  The average household in the sample had 0.35 U.S. migrants and 
0.71 internal migrants in 2002—or 1.06 migrants in total.   
 
There are sharp differences in migration experience among the five rural regions 
of Mexico.  The West-Central region traditionally has had the highest propensity to send 
migrants to the United States.  It currently has the highest participation rates in 
international migration and the most international migration experience.  Nearly 28% of 
all households in this region have at least one family member in the United States, and 
the average household has .62 U.S. migrants.  By contrast, 7.5%% of households in the 
south-southwest have U.S. migrants, with an average of .10 U.S. migrants per household.  
These inter-regional differences are the basis for comparing differences in the 
distributional and poverty effects of remittances at different levels of household 
involvement in migration.  
 
  8Figure 1 illustrates differences in historical trends in international migration, 
respectively, at the village level across the five regions from 1980 to 2002.  It was 
constructed from retrospective migration histories assembled for all family members in 
the ENHRUM sample, including sons and daughters who were not part of the household 
at the time of the survey.  Villages with large concentrations of international migrants in 
2002 have a history of increasing participation in migration throughout the 1980-2002 
period.  Only in rare cases did a village with a high concentration of migrants in 2002 
begin to participate in migration late in the period.  We use 2002 concentrations of 
migrants as a proxy for migration histories in our analysis of distributional and poverty 
effects of migrant remittances, presented below. 
 
Remittances and Income in Rural Mexico 
 
Detailed data on household-farm production, wage work, and migration make it 
possible to estimate total income for each household in the ENHRUM sample.  Total 
income is the sum of income from six sources:  family production (crop, livestock, 
nonagricultural, commerce, service, natural resource extraction); agricultural wage labor; 
nonagricultural wage labor; internal migrant remittances; international migrant 
remittances; and public transfers.  This list of incomes is exhaustive; the sum of income 
from the six sources equals household total net income. 
 
There are various methods to arrive at estimates of net income from rural 
household production activities.  We did not try to impute values of family inputs like 
  9labor, land and capital, because it is not obvious what prices should be used to do this.  
Net income from household production activities was estimated as the gross value of 
production (using observed local prices) minus purchased inputs.  This method yielded 
net incomes from crop production that were very low or negative in some cases, 
especially for staples and small animals.  Subtracting imputed values of family inputs 
(e.g., family labor at local wages) from these net income figures would yield mostly 
negative net staple and livestock incomes.  Gross income from livestock production was 
estimated as the change in value of standing herds between the end and start of the survey 
year, plus (a) sales of animals and animal products; (b) home consumption of home-
produced animals and animal products minus (c) livestock purchases and (d) livestock 
input costs (feed, medicines, and other costs).  Incomes from all other household 
production activities were estimated in a manner analogous to net crop income (as gross 
value of production minus purchased input costs).  Salary and wage income was summed 
across all household members and jobs.  Migrant remittances were summed across all 
remitters and, in the case of dollar-denominated remittances from the United States, 
transformed to pesos using the prevailing average 2002 exchange rate of 10 pesos per 
U.S. dollar. 
 
Table 2 summarizes rural households’ total net income and remittances from 
internal and international migrants, nationally and by region.  Average household total 
income for the whole sample in 2002 was 53,465 pesos (U.S. $5,346).  This comes out to 
an average per-capita income of approximately U.S. $1,372 per year.  The composition of 
incomes reported in the table reveals a significant role for migrant remittances in rural 
  10Mexico:  13 percent of household total income and 16 percent of per-capita income 
comes from migrant remittances (mostly from the United States).   
 
Migrant remittances are not equally distributed across regions (Table 2).  The 
percentage of household income from international migrant remittances ranged from 3.6 
in the Northwest to 20.1 in the Northeast.  The percentage from internal migrant 
remittances ranged from 0.54 to 3.7 percent.   
 
The numbers in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that migrant remittances potentially have 
significant impacts on rural income inequality and poverty, but these impacts are not 
likely to be uniform across regions with vastly different prevalence and histories of 
migration.  
 
Income Source Gini Decomposition 
 
To explore the impacts of remittances on rural income inequality, it is first 
necessary to select an inequality index.  Various indices exist.  Following Ray (1998), an 
inequality index should have 5 basic properties: (1) adherence to the Pigou-Dalton 
transfer principle; (2) symmetry; (3) independence of scale; (4) homogeneity with respect 
to population; and (5) decomposability. 
 
The Piguo-Dalton principle maintains that inequality, as measured by the index, 
should increase when income is transferred from a low-income household to a high-
  11income household.  An index displays symmetry if the measured level of inequality does 
not change when individuals trade positions in the income distribution—that is, the 
identity of individuals or households is irrelevant.  
 
Independence of income scale means that a proportional change in all incomes 
does not alter inequality.  Homogeneity means that a change in the size of the population 
will not affect measured inequality.  Finally, in order to explore influences of specific 
income sources on inequality, the index needs to be decomposable with respect to income 
sources.  (Ray also refers to decomposability by population subgroup; however, this is 
not our interest in this study.) 
 
The inequality measures that satisfy these 5 requirements include the coefficient 
of variation, Theil’s entropy index (T), Theil’s second measure of inequality (L), and the 
Gini coefficient (G).  The two Theil measures can be disaggregated by population 
subgroup but not by income source.  The Gini coefficient is probably the most intuitive 
measure of inequality, with its neat correspondence to the Lorenz curve and easy-to-
interpret decompositions of remittance effects.  This is the measure we use in the present 
study.  
 
Following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), the Gini coefficient for total income 
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  12where Sk represents the share of component k in total income, Gk is the source Gini, 
corresponding to the distribution of income from source k, and   is the Gini correlation 
of income from source k with the distribution of total income.
k R
2   
 
Equation (1) permits us to decompose the influence of any income component, in 
our case remittances, upon total income inequality, as the product of three easily 
interpreted terms:  
 
a)  how important the income source is with respect to total income (Sk) 
b)  how equally or unequally distributed the income source is (Gk) 
c)  whether or not the income source is correlated with total income (Rk). 
 
For example, if remittances represent a large share of total income, they may potentially 
have a large impact on inequality.  (If their share in total income is nil, so must be their 
contribution to inequality.)  However, if they are perfectly equally distributed (Gk = 0), 
they cannot influence inequality even if their magnitude is large.  If remittances are large 
and unequally distributed (Sk and Gk are large), they may either increase or decrease 
inequality, depending upon which households, at which points in the income distribution, 
receive them.  If remittances are unequally distributed and flow disproportionately 
towards households at the top of the income distribution (Rk is positive and large), their 
                                                 
2 The properties of Rk are the following: 
a)  -1 ≤ Rk ≤ 1. Rk equals zero if yk and Y are independent, and it equals 1(-1) if yk is 
an increasing (decreasing) function of total income. 
b)  If yk and Y are normally distributed, then Rk is equal to the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. 
 
  13contribution to inequality will be positive.  However, if they are unequally distributed but 
target poor households, remittances may have an equalizing effect on the rural income 
distribution, and the Gini index may be lower with than without remittances. 
 
Using the Gini decomposition, we can estimate the effect of small changes in 
remittances on inequality, holding income from all other sources constant (Stark, Taylor 
and Yitzhaki, 1986).  Consider a small percentage change in income from source j 
(remittances) equal to π, such that yj(π)=(1+ π)yj.  Then 
j







π                                                  (2) 
where Sj, Gj and Rj denote the souce-j income share, source Gini, and Gini correlation, 
and G denotes the Gini index of total income inequality prior to the remittance change.  
The percentage change in inequality resulting from a small percentage change in 
remittances equals the initial share of remittances in inequality minus the share of 
remittances in total income.  One can easily see that, as long as remittances are an 
important component of rural incomes,  
1)  If the Gini correlation of remittances and total income, Rj, is negative or 
zero, an increase in remittances necessarily reduces inequality, but 
2)  If the Gini correlation is positive, the distributional impact of remittances 
depends on the sign of RjGj-G. A necessary condition for inequality to 
increase with remittances is that the source Gini for remittances exceed the 
Gini for household total income, that is, Gj>G.  This follows from the 
property that Rj ≤ 1. 
 
  14Poverty Decomposition 
 
A modification of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty index was used to 
analyze the poverty implications of remittances.  We have found no such poverty 
decomposition in the literature for Mexico.  Huppi and Ravallion (1991) perform an 
income-source poverty decomposition for Indonesia.  More commonly one finds in recent 
literature that sectoral decompositions of poverty are proxied by undertaking a standard 
poverty decomposition for groups defined by primary sectoral source of income, or other 
characteristics such as household size, group or location.
3  This proxy method is difficult 
to justify where a typical farm household's income is diversified across a variety of 
activities, as is clearly the case in rural Mexico. 
 
Following the notation of Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984), let Yd = 
(Yd1,Yd2,...,YdI) represent household incomes in increasing order and let z > 0 denote the 
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where n is the total number of households, q = q(Yd; z) is the number of poor households, 
and gi = z - Ydi is the income shortfall (the gap between the household's income and the 
poverty line) of the ith (poor) household, and α is a parameter.  This index satisfies the 
                                                 
     
     3 For example, Baliascan (1993) did such a study for the Philippines; Gusstafsson 
and Makonnen (1993) explored principal income sources' effects on poverty incidence in 
Lesotho;  Boateng et al. (1992) decomposed by location and group for Ghana;  Kanbur 
(1990) decomposed poverty incidence by degree of income diversification, region and 
group and Kakwani (1993) by region and household characteristics in Cote d'Ivoire. 
  15two axioms formulated by Sen (1976, 1979) for poverty measures to satisfy: (1) that a 
reduction in the income of a poor household, ceteris paribus, increases the poverty 
measure (monotonicity);  and (2) that a pure transfer of income away from a poor 
household increases the poverty measure (the transfer axiom).  
 
FGT present a decomposition of this poverty measure by population subgroup, 
and Reardon and Taylor (1996) decompose the FGT poverty coefficient by income 
source.  To decompose P(Yd; z) by determinants of income, we substitute the sum of 
income across sources for Ydi in the FGT poverty index.  This yields 
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where q* denotes the number of households in poverty both before and after the change 
in remittances, and q- (q+) denotes the number of households that leave (enter) poverty 
as a result of the remittance change.  Assuming remittances have a positive effect on 
income (that is, there are not household-to-migrant remittances that outweigh migrant-to-
household transfers), the third term, 
α ) (e gi
+ q ∑ , drops out, and the poverty effect is 
negative (i.e., poverty decreases), or at least not positive.  The extent of this poverty 
  16effect must be determined empirically.  It hinges on whether or not poor households have 
access to remittance income. 
 
Three variants of the FGT poverty index are used to estimate the impacts of 
changes in remittances on rural poverty:   
•  The headcount measure (α=0, 
n
q
  =   z)   ; Y ( P d H ) measures the incidence of 
poverty, i.e., the share of the population living below the poverty line. 





  =   z)   ; Y ( P ) measures the depth of 
poverty, that is, how far below the poverty line the average poor household’s income 
falls. 
•  The squared poverty gap (α=2, 
2





  =   z)   ; Y ( P ), measures 
the severity of poverty and is sensitive to changes in the distribution of income among the 
poor (Adams, 2003). 
 
All Gini and poverty index decompositions presented below are for per-capita 
household income, in order to take into account differences in household size across 
regions and among households with access to different income sources. 
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Empirical Results 
 
Income-Source Inequality Decompositions 
 
Table 3 summarizes the contributions of income sources to per capita total income 
and income inequality in rural Mexico in 2002.  Column 1 presents income-source 
shares.  Migrant remittances represented 16 percent of average per-capita rural income in 
2002.  The vast majority of this remittance income (87 percent) came from migrants in 
the United States.  Wages were the largest income source, accounting for more than 50 
percent.  Of this, most (80 percent) was from non-agricultural employment.  Family 
production activities accounted for just under 29 percent of rural per-capita income, and 
government transfers represented 4.5 percent.  
 
Migrant remittances are unequally distributed across rural households (Column 
2).  The source Ginis for international and internal remittances are similar: 0.95 and 0.96, 
respectively.
4   
 
As indicated earlier, a high source Gini (Gk) does not imply that an income source 
has an unequalizing effect on total-income inequality.  An income source may be 
unequally distributed yet favor the poor.  This is the case for internal migrant remittances.  
The Gini correlation between internal remittances and the distribution of total per-capita 
                                                 
4 These source Ginis are high in part because they incluye zero remittances for some 
households. 
  18income (Rk) is only 0.36, comparable to that of agricultural wages.  Because of the low 
Gini correlation between internal-migrant remittances and total-income rankings, the 
percentage contribution of internal remittances to inequality (1.1 percent) is smaller than 
the percentage contribution to income (2.0 percent).  Thus, internal remittances have a 
slight equalizing effect on the distribution of total rural income.  A 10% increase in 
internal remittances, other things being equal, reduces the Gini coefficient of total income 
by 0.1 percent.   
 
The Gini correlation between international migrant remittances and total income 
rankings is much higher (R=0.78). Because of this, international remittances have an 
unequalizing effect on rural incomes; a 10-percent increase in remittances from migrants 
abroad increases the Gini coefficient by 0.3 percent.     
 
Government transfers are unequally distributed (Gk = 0.79).  However, the Gini 
correlation between transfers and total income is low (Rk = 0.29), indicating that transfers 
favor the poor more than any other income source.  Other things being equal, a 10-
percent increase in government transfers is associated with a 0.3-percent decrease in the 
Gini coefficient of total income.  In rural Mexico, these transfers include decoupled 
income payments to basic grain producers, under the PROCAMPO program, as well as 
needs-based transfers under PROGRESA.
5  Agricultural wages are the largest income 
                                                 
5 PROCAMPO was instituted in the context of a phase-out of price guarantees to basic 
grain producers.  It represented a shift from price based support measures to direct 
income payments.  PROGRESA provides payments to poor rural households, linked to 
enrollment of children in schools and local clinics. 
  19equalizers in rural Mexico, while income from family production activities has the largest 
positive effect on inequality. 
 
Both the importance and the distributional impact of migrant remittances and 
other income sources differ across regions.  In West-Central Mexico (Table 4a), which 
has the highest prevalence of international migration, remittances from international 
migrants have an equalizing effect on rural incomes, equivalent to that of government 
transfers.  There, a 10-percent increase in foreign remittances decreases the total-income 
Gini by 0.3 percent.  In this region, international migrant remittances represent nearly 16 
percent of per-capita total income.  The source Gini for international migrant remittances 
(0.87) is lower and the Gini correlation (0.50) is much lower in the west-central region 
than in rural Mexico as a whole.  By contrast, in the lowest migration region of 
southeastern Mexico, international migrant remittances constitute 6 percent of per-capita 
total income, and both the source Gini and the Gini correlation for this income source are 
high (0.98 and 0.87, respectively).  Marginal changes in international remittances 
increase inequality in this region.  In both regions, family production and non-agricultural 
wages have the most unequalizing effects on the rural income distribution, and 
agricultural wages are income equalizers.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the estimated effects of 10-percent increases in international 
and internal migrant remittances and the percentages of households with migrants in each 
of the 5 census regions.  Figures 2a-b illustrate the relationship between these two 
variables.  Figure 2a is suggestive of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
  20migration and the distributional effect of remittances, in the case of international 
migration. The Gini elasticity of foreign remittances is positive and highest in the region 
in which just over 14 percent of households have family migrants abroad (the Southeast), 
it is lower in the region in which 20 percent of households have international migrants 
(the Northeast), and it is negative in the region in which 28 percent of households 
participate in international migration (West-Center).   
 
The elasticity of internal migrant remittances is close to zero in all five regions 
(Figure 2b), despite shares of households with internal migrants that range from 12 to 35 
percent.  Rural income inequality is much less sensitive to given percentage changes in 
internal remittances than to changes in international remittances.  This is due both to the 
low (Gini) correlation between internal remittances and the distribution of total income 




                                                 
6 In two cases presented in Tables 3 and 4a income-source Gini coefficients are equal to 
1.0 (both of these are for family production).  This does not imply perfect income 
inequality, but rather, reflects the presence of some negative income values.  Income-
source Gini coefficients greater than 1.0 have been reported elsewhere in the literature 
(e.g., see Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985).  The Gini coefficient is a measure of dispersion, 
similar to a coefficient of variation.  It is equal to the expected difference between two 
randomly drawn observations divided by the mean. One can view the mean as the 
expected difference between each observation and zero. If all observations are positive, 
zero is outside the range of observations, so the ratio is lower than one. However, if some 
observations are negative, zero is not outside the range of the group, and the ratio 
depends on the location of zero in the range.  Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002, p. 79) argue 
that the ability to handle negative incomes is an advantage of the Gini coefficient over 
Atkinson's index. 
 
  21Effects of Migrant Remittances on Poverty 
 
A poverty line, z, is required in order to estimate the effects of changes in migrant 
remittances on poverty.  The poverty line we use is the per-capita income required to 
purchase a basic basket of food and nonfood items in rural areas.  It was estimated by the 
Mexican government (SEDESOL) at 28.1 pesos per day, including 15.4 pesos for food, 
3.5 for basic health and education, and 9.8 for clothing, shelter, utilities, and 
transportation.
7  Impoverished individuals are those who were living in households in 
which the per-capita income per day was less than 28.1 pesos.  Table 6 reports the share 
of the population living below the poverty line in each region and in all of rural Mexico 
in 2002.  Overall, 58 percent of rural Mexicans live in households with per-capita 
incomes below the poverty line.  The incidence of poverty ranges from 35 percent in the 
Northwest region to 81 percent in the South-Southwest.  
 
To estimate the effect of migrant remittances on poverty, we first calculated the 
three variants of the FGT poverty measure, using Equation 3 with α = 0, 1 and 2.  We 
then decreased each of the two types of remittances, in turn, by 10 percent.  Households 
that did not receive remittances were unaffected.  The poverty effects of changes in 
remittances depend upon the extent to which remittances flow to poor (and, depending on 
the measure, very poor) households.   
 
                                                 
7 See http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/subsecretarias/prospectiva/medicion_pobreza 
  22Results of the poverty experiments are reported in Table 7.  Overall, poverty 
decreases when migrant remittances go up.  Nationally, the rural poverty effect is 
substantially greater for international remittances than for remittances from internal 
migrants using all three poverty measures.  For example, the FGT index with α=2 
decreases by 0.53 percent as a result of a 10-percent increase in international remittances, 
compared with 0.30 percent for internal remittances.  The headcount measure decreases 
by .39 percentage points when internal remittances increase, but by 0.77 percent in 
response to a rise in remittances from abroad.   
Poverty elasticities of remittances from migrants abroad vary sharply across 
regions.  The sensitivity of poverty to international remittances is greatest in the high 
migration, West-Center region, and it is smallest in the low migration, South-Southwest 
region.  Other things being equal, a 10-percent increase in international remittances 
reduces poverty by 1.64 percent in the West-Center (according to the FGT index with 
α=2), compared with only 0.11 percent in the South-Southwest.  Based on the headcount 
measure, poverty decreases by 1.68 percent in the West-Center, but there is no change in 
poverty in the South-Southwest.  The poverty gap measures reveal a similar pattern of 
greater sensitivity of poverty to remittances in regions in which a large percentage of 
households have international migrants.  This is illustrated in Figure 3.  The relationship 
between poverty impacts of remittances (for α=2)  and the extent of household 
participation in international migration is monotonically negative, and it is more 
pronounced than the relationship between remittance impacts on inequality and migration 
prevalence reported in Figure 2. 
 
  23These findings suggest that the ameliorative effect of international remittances on 
rural poverty increases with the prevalence of migration.  They would appear to represent 
a poverty corollary to the argument advanced by Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986), 
illustrated in Figure 2, that the distributional effects of migration become more equal as 
increasing numbers of households gain access to foreign labor markets.  In theory, the 
relationship between poverty elasticities and the prevalence of migration is no more 
obvious than the relationship between migration and inequality.  It depends on the extent 
to which poor households gain access to migrant labor markets over time, which is an 
empirical question.  It appears that, in the case of international migration, the expansion 







Our findings using nationally and regionally representative data from Mexico 
indicate that remittances from migrants abroad slightly increase rural income inequalities, 
while remittances from internal migrants are income equalizers.  However, both types of 
remittances have an equalizing effect on incomes in high-migration areas.  Our findings 
reinforce the argument advanced in Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) that expansion of 
migration has an initially unequalizing effect on the rural income distribution, but the 
diffusion of access to migration eventually makes the effect of remittances on rural 
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incomes more equitable (or at least, less inequitable).  This may explain inconsistencies 
in the estimated effects of remittances on income inequalities from existing studies, using 
data from economies with different levels of integration with migrant labor markets.   
 
Despite their positive effect on inequality, international migrant remittances 
reduce rural poverty, by a greater amount than internal remittances.  The ameliorative 
effect of remittances on poverty increases as economies become more integrated with 
migrant labor markets.  To our knowledge, there is no precedent in the literature to this 
finding, which holds in rural Mexico regardless of whether the migration is to internal or 
foreign destinations. 
 
These findings have a number of policy implications.  Policies that restrict 
migration increase poverty, especially in regions where the prevalence of household 
participation in migration is high.  On the other hand, measures that promote remittances 
or that enhance remittance multipliers on incomes in migrant-sending households can be 
an effective poverty-reduction tool.  The impacts of these measures on poverty and 
inequality would appear to be most favorable in the highest migration regions.  
 Table 1. Migration Summary Statistics for Rural Mexico, by Region 
 Region  Variable  Percentages Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum
South-South East  Households with US migrants (%)  7.53%   -  0.26   -   - 
   US Migrants per Household     0.10  0.42  0  3 
  
Households with Internal migrants 
(%) 34.95%  -       0.48  -   - 
   Internal Migrants per Household     0.89  1.61  0  8 
   Household Sample Size     372          
Center  Households with US migrants (%)  14.52%   -  0.35   -   - 
   US Migrants per Household     0.27  0.89  0  8 
  
Households with Internal migrants 
(%) 29.32%  -       0.46  -   - 
   Internal Migrants per Household     0.70  1.48  0  8 
   Household Sample Size    365          
Center-West  Households with US migrants (%)  27.75%   -  0.45   -   - 
   US Migrants per Household    0.62  1.29  0  7 
  
Households with Internal migrants 
(%) 30.06%  -       0.46  -   - 
   Internal Migrants per Household    1.02  1.99  0  10 
   Household Sample Size     346          
Northwest  Households with US migrants (%)  12.09%   -  0.33   -   - 
   US Migrants per Household     0.23  0.79  0  9 
  
Households with Internal migrants 
(%) 22.42%  -       0.42  -   - 
   Internal Migrants per Household     0.72  1.71  0  8 
   Household Sample Size    339          
Northeast  Households with US migrants (%)  19.72%   -  0.40   -   - 
   US Migrants per Household     0.54  1.43  0  9 
   Households with Internal migrants  11.67%   -  0.32   -   - 
  26(%) 
   Internal Migrants per Household    0.23  0.80  0  8 
   Household Sample Size     360          
Total  Households with US migrants (%)  16.22%   -  0.37   -   - 
   US Migrants per Household     0.35  1.04  0  9 
  
Households with Internal migrants 
(%) 25.76%  -       0.44  -   - 
   Internal Migrants per Household     0.71  1.58  0  10 
   Household Sample Size     1782          
Source: ENHRUM, 2003         
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Table 2.  Rural Mexico Household Income and Remittances, 2002          





Center Northwest Northeast TOTAL
Pesos 27,400      48,285 52,353 87,841  54,351  53,465 
U.S. Dollars 2,740  4,828  5,235  8,784  5,435  5,347 
Migrant Remittances as % of Total Income  10.37%            16.25% 14.79% 4.85% 20.69% 12.69%
Internal 3.66%            3.26% 1.04% 1.20% 0.54% 1.68%
International 6.71%            12.99% 13.75% 3.64% 20.15% 11.01%
Sample size: 1,782             



































Transfers  .045 0.79 0.29 .017  -0.280 
U.S.  Remittances  .140 0.95 0.78 .169   0.281 
Internal 
Remittances  .020 0.96 0.36 .011  -0.089 
Family 
production  .288 1.00 0.75 .350   0.630 
Agriculture  wages  .117 0.82 0.37 .057  -0.601 
Non-agriculture 
wages  .390 0.80 0.78 .396   0.061 
Total  Income  1.000 0.61  1.00 1.000   
  Source:  Estimates from Mexico National Rural Household Survey, 2003. 
  N = 1782 households.  All incomes are per-capita. 
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Table 4a.  Gini Decomposition by Income Source:  High Migration 
































Transfers  0.047 0.84  0.25 0.019  -0.279 
U.S.  Remittances  0.159 0.87  0.50 0.133  -0.263 
Internal 
Remittances  0.009 0.98  0.42 0.007  -0.019 
Family 
production  0.231 1.00  0.72 0.320  0.880 
Agriculture  wages  0.110 0.83  0.20 0.035  -0.746 
Non-agriculture 
wages  0.445 0.75  0.76 0.487  0.428 
Total  Income  1.000 0.52  1.00 1.000   
  Source:  Estimates from Mexico National Rural Household Survey, 2003. 
  N = 346 households.  All incomes are per-capita. 
 
 
Table 4b.  Gini Decomposition by Income Source:  Low Migration 
































Transfers  0.083 0.60  0.19 0.015  -0.674 
U.S.  Remittances  0.064 0.98  0.87 0.086  0.224 
Internal 
Remittances  0.038 0.93  0.42 0.024  -0.145 
Family 
production  0.438 0.92  0.86 0.550  1.092 
Agriculture  wages  0.126 0.77  0.42 0.064  -0.610 
Non-agriculture 
wages  0.252 0.86  0.77 0.265  0.114 
Total  Income  1.000 0.63  1.00 1.000   
  Source:  Estimates from Mexico National Rural Household Survey, 2003. 
  N = 372 households.  All incomes are per-capita. 
 
 Table 5.  Inter-regional Comparison of Marginal Effects of Migrant Remittances on Inequality of Per-capita Total Income 
(Gini Elasticities) 
 







Effect of 10% 
Increase in 
Remittances on 








Effect of 10% 
Increase in 
Remittances 




Southeast   7.530   0.224  34.950  -0.145 
Northwest          12.090   0.576 22.420 -0.018
Center          14.520   0.784 29.320 -0.170
Northeast          19.720 -0.114 11.670 -0.044
West-Center          27.750 -0.263 30.060 -0.019
All Regions  16.220   0.281  25.760  -0.089 
 
  31Table 6.  Incidence of Rural Poverty, National and by Region in 2002 using the Headcount Measure 
 
Percentage of Rural Population in Impoverished Households 






Food, Basic Health,  
Education, Clothing, 
Shelter, Utilities and 
Transportation 
South-Southeast  0.62      0.69 0.81
Center  0.36      0.45 0.63
West-Center  0.30      0.36 0.52
Northwest  0.20      0.25 0.35
Northeast  0.38      0.43 0.58
All Regions  0.38      0.44 0.58
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Table 7.  Rural Poverty Impacts of a 10% Increase in Migrant Remittances 
 
International Migrants  Internal Migrants 
% Change in Poverty Resulting from a 10% 
Increase in Remittances Using FGT Index 
% Change in Poverty Resulting from a 10% 































Southeast  7.53       0.00% -0.11% -0.11% 34.95 -0.33% -0.41% -0.45%
Northwest  12.09        -0.85% -0.30% -0.31% 11.67 0.00% -0.16% -0.13%
Center  14.52        -1.30% -0.35% -0.33% 22.42 -0.87% -0.61% -0.67%
Northeast  19.72        -0.48% -0.58% -0.51% 11.67 -0.48% -0.10% -0.08%
West-Center  27.75        -1.68% -1.65% -1.64% 30.06 0.00% -0.05% -0.05%
Rural Mexico  16.22        -0.77% -0.53% -0.53% 25.76 -0.39% -0.30% -0.30%
 
 Figure 1.   Trends in International Migration, By Village and Region of Rural Mexico, 
1980-2002 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  34Figure 2.  Relationship Between Regional Percentages of Households with Migrants 
and Effect on Gini of a 10% Increase in Remittances, by Migrant Destination 
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  35Figure 3.  Relationship Between Poverty Elasticity of Migrant Remittances and Regional 
Percentage of Households with International Migrants (FGT Index, α=2) 
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